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And the loser is... Plurality Voting
Jean-Franc¸ois Laslier
Abstract This paper reports on a vote for choosing the best voting rules that was
organized among the participants of the Voting Procedures workshop in July, 2010.
Among 18 voting rules, Approval Voting won the contest, and Plurality Voting re-
ceived no support at all.
1 Introduction
Experts have different opinions as to which is the best voting procedure. The Lever-
hulme Trust sponsored 2010 Voting Power in Practice workshop, held at the Chateau
du Baffy, Normandy, from 30 July to 2 August 2010, was organized for the purpose
of discussing this matter. Participants of the workshop were specialists in voting
procedures and, during the wrap-up session at the end of the workshop, it was de-
cided to organize a vote among the participants to elect “the best voting procedure”.
The present paper reports on this vote. It contains in the Appendix statements by
some of the voters/participants about this vote and voting rules in general.
2 The vote
Previous discussion had shown that different voting rules might be advisable under
different circumstances, so that a more concrete problem than “What is the best
voting rule” should be tackled. The question for the vote was: “What is the best
voting rule for your town to use to elect the mayor?”
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Even with this phrasing, it was realized afterwards that not all participants had
exactly the same thing in mind. In particular, some of them were thinking of a large
electorate and some were rather thinking of a committee (the city council) as the
electorate. This can be inferred from the participants’ comments in the Appendix
and is clearly a weakness of this “experiment.”
Of course, an interesting feature of this vote is the fact that it was a vote on voting
rules by voting theorists. So the participants arrived with quite a heavy background
of personal knowledge and ideas. But the way the vote was improvised was such
that no one had much time to think things over, discuss and coordinate with others,
or calculate. Moreover, no candidates were clear common knowledge front-runners,
and the final result was apparently not anticipated by most voters.
The possibilities of strategic manipulation were thus quite limited and one can
indeed see from the comments that most of these approval votes should be inter-
preted as the expression of sincere individual opinions. As one referee pointed out:
this vote may be the last “naive” vote on voting rules. This adds a particular signifi-
cance to its result, and also suggests that the experiment should be done again, now
that the results are known.1
2.1 Candidates: the voting rules in question
The set of “candidates,” that is the list of considered voting rules was rather infor-
mally decided: participants just wrote on the paper board voting rules to be voted
upon. Eighteen voting rules were nominated, the definitions of which can be found
in Appendix 2.
Some rules should really be considered as possible ways to organize elections
and will, in usual circumstances, provide indeed a unique winner. Others will of-
ten yield not a single winner but a set of possible winners, among which the final
choice has to be made by one means or another. The list contains several Condorcet-
consistent rules which agree on a unique outcome when the Condorcet winner ex-
ists2 but which differ when there is no Condorcet winner and, in that case, often
yield several winners. For instance the Uncovered set is a singleton only if there is
a Condorcet winner3, the Copeland winner is always in the Uncovered set and the
Uncovered set is always included in the Top Cycle. The voting rules also differ as
to their informational basis.
1 My guess, based on the theoretical analysis of strategic voting under Approval Voting, is that the
result would not be different.
2 The existence of several Condorcet winners simultaneously is a rare phenomenon.
3 No randomization scheme was considered. In particular the optimal solutions to the Condorcet
paradox studied by Laffond, Laslier and LeBreton (1993) and Dutta and Laslier (1999) were not
on the list of voting procedures.
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1. Some of them require very little information: Plurality voting and Majority vot-
ing with a runoff simply ask the voter to provide the name of one (or two) candi-
dates. Approval Voting asks the voter to say “yes” or “no” to each candidate.
2. Most rules require that the voter ranks the candidates: this is the classical frame-
work of Arrowian social choice (Arrow 1951). There is no inter-personal com-
parisons of alternatives, which means that the ballots are not intended to convey
interpretation of the kind “candidate a is better for voter i than for voter j”. The
intra-personal structure is purely ordinal, which means that we may know that a
is better than b for i, but we cannot know how much better.
3. Finally, some of them allow inter-personal comparisons, with intra-personal
comparisons being ordinal (Leximin, Majority Judgement) or cardinal (Range
Voting).
Most rules extend the majority principle in the sense that, if there are only two
candidates, they select the one preferred by a majority of the voters. Range voting,
which maximizes the average evaluation, does not fulfill this principle: indeed, ac-
cording to classical utilitarianism, if a majority of voters slightly prefer a to b while
a minority strongly prefers b to a, it may be better to choose b than a, against the
majority principle. Therefore, under Range voting, if voters reflect in their vote this
pattern of interpersonal comparisons, the minority candidate b may well be elected
against a. Such is also the case for the “Majority judgement” system (despite its
name) which maximizes the median evaluation and for the Leximin, which maxi-
mizes the worst evaluation.
2.2 The procedure
2.2.1 The electorate
The 22 voters were the participants of the workshop (one participant abstained).
Some of them are advocates of a specific voting rule; for instance, Ken Ritchie
and Alessandro Gardini are active in Great Britain in promoting the “Alternative
Vote”: a system of vote transfers also known as the “Hare” system. Others, like
Dan Felsenthal, are advocates of the Condorcet principle and strongly defended this
principle during the workshop. But it is fair to say that most of the participants would
say that different voting rules have advantages and disadvantages. This might be one
of the reasons why no-one objected to the use of Approval voting for this particular
vote.
2.2.2 The voting rule
We used Approval voting for this election. Somebody made the suggestion and there
was no counter-proposal. In retrospect, this choice was quite natural: this procedure
is fast and easy to use even if the number of candidates is large. Asking voters
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Number of approvals 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10 total
Number of ballots 0 2 7 3 5 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 22
Table 1 Number of approved candidates
to rank the 18 candidates was hardly feasible in our case. Approval voting is also
advisable when the set of alternatives has been loosely designed and contains very
similar candidates4. One may nevertheless regret that we lost the occasion to gather,
through the vote, more information on the participants’ opinions about the different
voting rules. Hopefully the next section, where results are presented, will show that
we can already learn quite a lot from the analysis of the Approval ballots.
3 The results
3.1 Approval score and other indicators
Voters approved on average 3.55 candidates out of 18, with a distribution provided
in Table 1. This figure is not at odds with what has been observed in other circum-
stances (Laslier and Sanver 2010).
Table 2 provides the scores of the candidates:
Approvals This is the number of voters who approve the candidate.
Approval score This is the percentage of the population who approve the candi-
date. Approval Voting is approved by 15 voters out of 22, that is 68.18%.
Approval Voting is the winner of the election. It is worth noticing that it is the only
candidate approved by more than half of the voters5. Three candidates received no
vote at all: Fishburn, Untrapped Set, and Plurality.
There are actually many different ways to compute scores and other indicators
from a set of Approval ballots. Table 3 provides some, which are now defined. The
number of voters who approved of both candidates c and c′ is called the association
of c and c′, and is denoted by as(c,c′). The number of voters who approved c is
denoted by as(c).
Markov score This score is computed as follows. The candidate “present at date
t” is denoted c(t). At date t chose at random one voter v. If v approves c(t), keep
this candidate for the next date: c(t+1) = c(t). If not choose c(t+1) at random
among the candidates that v approves. This defines a Markov chain over candi-
dates whose stationary distribution is the Markov score. For instance a candidate
with Markov score .3 is, in the long run of this process, present 30% of the time.
4 See the cloning-consistency condition (Tideman 1987) and the composition-consistency property
(Laffond, Laine´ and Laslier 1996).
5 One voter wrote on his/her ballot “Approval Voting with a runoff.” This procedure was not on the
list. This ballot was counted as an approbation of Approval voting.
And the loser is... Plurality Voting 5
Voting Rule Approvals Approving percentage
Approval Voting App 15 68.18
Alternative Vote Alt 10 45.45
Copeland Cop 9 40.91
Kemeny Kem 8 36.36
Two-Round Majority 2R 6 27.27
Coombs Coo 6 27.27
Simpson Sim 5 22.73
Majority Judgement Bal 5 22.73
Borda Bor 4 18.18
Black Bla 3 13.64
Range Voting RV 2 9.09
Nanson Nan 2 9.09
Leximin Lex 1 4.54
Top-Cycle TC 1 4.54
Uncovered Set UC 1 4.54
Fishburn 0 0
Untrapped Set 0 0
Plurality 0 0
Table 2 Approval scores
Focus The focus of candidate c is the sum over all candidates k of the fraction of
c-voters who also approved k.
f (c) =∑
k
as(c,k)
as(k)
.
The focus measures the ability of a candidate to attract votes from voters who
also voted for others.
Centrality This indicator is based on the following Markov chain. The transition
probability from c to c′ is as(c,c′)/∑c6=c′ as(c,c′). The centrality measure is the
associated stationary probability. This is a natural measure of centrality in the
multi-graph where there is a link between two candidates each time a voter ap-
proves them both.
Similarity This indicator is based on the following Markov chain. Given the can-
didate c, one chooses at random a voter v. If v approves c one replaces c by c′
chosen at random among the candidates that v approves. If v does not approve c,
one replaces c by c′ chosen at random among all the candidates. The similarity
measure is the associated stationary probability. This means that, given a candi-
date c, one looks for a candidate c′ which is similar to c in the sense that a voter
has approved both.
Satisfaction If v has approved B(v) candidates, count 1/B(v) points for each. The
total count of candidate c is thus between 0 and the number of voters, and the
sum over candidates is the number of voters. (See Kilgour, 2010.)
Dilution This is the average number of candidates approved by the voters who
approve a given candidate. Let as(v,c,k) be 1 if voter v approves both c and k,
6 Jean-Franc¸ois Laslier
Approvals Markov focus central. simil. satisf. dilution
App 15 36.44 12.53 15.65 10.44 5.14 4.07
Alt 10 11.70 9.01 11.90 8.39 2.67 4.50
Cop 9 14.60 6.90 9.86 8.12 3.24 4.22
Kem 8 10.56 6.56 8.16 7.61 2.39 4.00
2R 6 6.91 5.50 7.14 6.86 1.71 4.5
Coo 6 6.28 4.88 7.48 6.89 1.63 4.67
Sim 5 2.82 7.17 8.50 6.52 .99 6.00
Bal 5 2.26 4.69 7.48 6.62 1.05 5.40
Bor 4 4.42 5.08 5.78 6.16 1.24 5.25
Bla 3 .86 5.59 6.12 5.83 .47 7.00
RV 2 1.95 1.60 1.70 5.55 .70 3.50
Nan 2 .29 4.35 5.10 5.49 .24 8.50
Lex 1 .42 1.67 1.36 5.17 .20 5.00
TC 1 .30 1.82 1.70 5.17 .17 6.00
UC 1 .21 2.25 2.04 5.16 .14 7.00
Table 3 Various indicators
Approvals Markov focus central. simil. adjust. dilution
Approvals 1 .935 .930 .958 .999 .980 -.547
Markov .935 1 .851 .981 .930 .878 -.285
focus .930 .851 1 .839 .943 .966 -.511
central .958 .981 .839 1 .952 .897 -.347
simil. .999 .930 .943 .952 1 .984 -.546
adjust. .980 .878 .966 .897 .984 1 -.603
dilution -.547 -.285 -.511 -.347 -.546 -.603 1
Table 4 Correlations among indicators
and 0 ifnot. Then:
dil(c) =
1
as(c)∑v ∑k
as(v,c,k).
Notice that this indicator can be computed with a formula somehow dual to the
focus:
dil(c) =∑
k
as(c,k)
as(c)
.
The dilution thus measures to what extent supporters of a candidate also vote for
other candidates. It should not be interpreted as an indicator of the strength of
the candidate but as a part of the description of the electorate of the candidate: do
these voters give exclusive support (low dilution), or do they support many other
candidates (high dilution).
These indicators are all highly correlated with the approval score, except for the
dilution (see Table 4).
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App Alt Cop Kem 2R Coo Sim Bal Bor Bla RV Nan Lex TC UC
App 15 7 7 4 3 3 4 5 3 3 2 2 1 1 1
Alt 7 10 2 3 5 4 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 0
Cop 7 2 9 4 1 2 3 4 2 1 0 2 0 0 1
Kem 4 3 4 8 1 3 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
2R 3 5 1 1 6 3 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 0
Coo 3 4 2 3 3 6 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Sim 4 3 3 3 1 1 5 2 2 2 0 2 0 1 1
Bal 5 3 4 1 1 2 2 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Bor 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 4 1 0 2 0 0 1
Bla 3 3 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 0
RV 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
Nan 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 1
Lex 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
TC 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
UC 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Table 5 Association matrix
App Alt Cop Kem 2R Coo Sim Bal Bor Bla RV Nan Lex TC UC
App 1 .7 .78 .5 .5 .5 .8 1 .75 1 1 1 1 1 1
Alt .47 1 .22 .38 .83 .67 .6 .6 .25 1 .5 .5 1 1 0
Cop .47 .2 1 .5 .17 .33 .6 .8 .50 .33 0 1 0 0 1
Kem .27 .3 .44 1 .17 .5 .6 .2 .25 .33 0 .5 0 1 1
2R .2 .5 .11 .12 1 .5 .2 .2 .5 .67 0 .5 1 0 0
Coo .2 .4 .22 .38 .5 1 .2 .4 .25 .33 .5 .5 0 0 0
Sim .27 .3 .33 .38 .17 .17 1 .4 .50 .67 0 1 0 1 1
Bal .33 .3 .44 .12 .17 .33 .4 1 .25 .33 .5 .5 0 0 0
Bor .20 .1 .22 .12 .33 .17 .4 .2 1 .33 0 1 0 0 1
Bla .20 .3 .11 .12 .33 .17 .4 .2 .25 1 0 .5 1 1 0
RV .13 .1 0 0 0 .17 0 .2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Nan .13 .1 .22 .12 .17 .17 .4 .2 .5 .33 0 1 0 0 1
Lex .07 .1 0 0 .17 0 0 0 0 .33 0 0 1 0 0
TC .07 .1 0 .12 0 0 .2 0 0 .33 0 0 0 1 0
UC .07 0 .11 .12 0 0 .2 0 .25 0 0 .5 0 0 1
Table 6 Conditional association matrix
3.2 Structure of the set of candidates
Table 5 shows the number of voters who approved each pair of candidates, and
Table 6 shows the distribution of these association numbers for each candidate. For
instance 7/10 = 70% of the voters who approved the Alternative Vote also approved
Approval Voting while 7/15= 47% of the voters who approved Approval Voting also
approved the Alternative Vote. It is interesting to note that 83% of the supporters of
two-round majority voting also support the Alternative Vote, but such is the case of
only 22% of the Copeland supporters. One may also notice that all the supporters
of the Majority Judgement are also supporters of Approval Voting.
To obtain a more global view, one may compute various distances between can-
didates. Consider for instance for the similarity index
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sim(c,c′) =
as(c,c′)
as(c)
+
as(c,c′)
as(c′)
which ranges from 0 (when the electorates of c and c′ are disjoint) to 2 (when they
are identical) and define
dist(c,c′) = 2− sim(c,c′).
It turns out that there exists a very good Euclidean representation of the 15 candi-
dates in 3 dimensions, that renders 90% of the sum of square of distances.6 Figures
1 and 2 are side views of this representation. Approval Voting is in the center. The
points on the right are rules which are important in the social choice literature: Un-
covered set, Copeland, Nanson, Kemeny, Simpson, even if they are not very prac-
tical. Borda is in this group, close to Nanson. The points on the left contain three
practical solutions to the voting problem: Two-round majority, the Alternative Vote,
and Black. Leximin is not far from this group. Coombs and Majority Judgement are
close one to the other, with Range Voting not far. The Top-cycle is isolated.
This structure reflects the vote profile since by definition, two voting rules are
represented close one to the other when the same voters approved both.
Studying how candidate rules are associated in the voters’ ballots, it appears
that the winner is receiving votes associated with all the other candidates. Approval
Voting can be described as a “centrist” candidate in this vote. Even if one can detect
some pattern in the vote profile that differentiates votes for more “theoretical” rules
from votes for more “practical” rules, the electorate does not appear to be split.
6 See Appendix 3 for more details.
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Fig. 1 Axes 1 and 2
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Fig. 2 Axes 1 and 3
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4 Conclusion
The analysis of the approval ballots show that Approval Voting was a clear winner
of this election. This is somehow surprising since Approval Voting was not much
discussed during the workshop. But this voting rule has already received a lot of
attention in the academic literature, and was certainly familiar to the participants.
A striking fact is that Plurality rule (First Past the Post) received no approval.
The whole ranking of the candidate procedures according to their approval scores
seems also robust since alternative ways to count the ballots produce rather similar
rankings.
Appendix 1: Contributions of the participants
Participants were ex post invited to write a brief statement that would explain their
vote and their view about this “election”. One-half of them did it, after having read
my own contribution (see below) as an example.
It must be acknowledged that, from a scientific point of view, the experimental
protocol was a little loose. The nomination procedure for the set of candidate voting
rules was informal and voters did not have all the time required to learn everything
about all of them.
Fuad Aleskerov: “¿From my point of view our voting for the rules was rather spontaneous.
For instance, I know more than 30 rules which can be listed for our voting after reading
careful studies, by colleagues, of their properties.”
It is also worth remarking that, under Approval Voting, it is not so easy to re-
member after several days or weeks which candidates you approved out of 18.
Marc Kilgour: “I really can’t remember very well why I voted the way I did. As I recall,
the objective was to propose a system to elect the mayor of a town, without any indication
of the number of candidates. I think I assumed that there would not be many. I followed
the approval strategy of approving everything that seemed to be above average ”utility,”
whatever that would mean. I voted for approval (my actual favorite) and range because they
focus on acceptability rather than ranks. I also voted for two or three others that, it seemed
to me, were complicated enough to be likely to produce something that would maximize
the sum of the utilities but at the same time sophisticated enough to avoid features I don’t
like such as non-monotonicity. Beyond that, I can’t remember much.”
This point holds certainly true, as well, for preference-based balloting: it is not so
easy to remember how you ranked the whole set of alternatives; it distinguishes these
systems from the familiar single-name Plurality and Two-Round Majority voting
rules. The set of received contributions, which follow, show well the variety of view
points of the experts in the field.
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A. Baujard
The question we have been asked implied to apply the rule in a real political con-
text, involving citizens with their own desires, their own intellectual abilities and
the differences among them. Choosing the good rule for a democratic mayor elec-
tion predicates to pay attention to these features rather than to my own preferences
among rules. Through the field-experiments we have conducted, I have learnt that
most voters are frustrated by voting rules which gives little scope to the expression
of their nuanced preferences, which are sometimes tinted by hesitations, indiffer-
ence, significant differences between strong vs. weak preferences... These nuances
have yet a strong impact on results especially in the case of uninominal voting rules,
where a clear cut decision is always required to infer individual preferences. In
a democracy, I claim that this should question the legitimacy of the winner in such
context. I am therefore not convinced by plurality rules, whatever one or two rounds,
Condorcet principle, or any uninominal voting rules in general.
Among plurinominal rules, I focus on the importance of simplicity to explain
the rule, and to vote. Above all, I paid attention to transparency, meaning a wide
understanding of the process of deriving a result from the ballots, and the ability
of citizens to take actively part in the process of counting the votes. These desired
properties rule out Alternative Vote, Borda rules and Majority Judgement among
others.
Many voters in our experiments spontaneously preferred range voting, begging
for the ability of giving negative grades, or a wide range of different grades. Even
though this would also be my favorite in an ideal world, I regret how range voting
depends on differences in the meaning of grades among people, how it is manipula-
ble — which causes strong inequalities among the voting power of different citizens
according to their ability to manipulate. This argument, I admit, may be question-
able in a reduced city council, but ruling out range voting seemed cautious in the
absence of information on its size and composition.
I have eventually given just one approval in the vote on voting rules : one to
approval voting. It is because I had the ability of approving other rules that my
choice of giving just one vote was truly meaningful.
D. Felsenthal
I adhere to the Condorcet Principle as a normative principle when one must elect
one out of three or more candidates. This principle prescribes that should a candidate
defeat every other candidate in pairwise comparisons (a Condorcet winner), it must
be elected, and should a candidate be defeated by every other candidate in pairwise
comparisons (a Condorcet loser), it must not be elected. This principle conveys the
fundamental idea that the opinion of the majority should prevail, at least when ma-
jority comparisons pinpoint an unambiguous winner and/or an unambiguous loser.
The Condorcet Principle takes into account only the ordinal preferences of every
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voter between any pair of alternatives because attempting to take into account also
voters’ cardinal preferences (as under the Range Voting procedure) would not only
imply that a Condorcet winner may not be elected or, worse, that a Condorcet loser
may be elected, but also that inter-personal comparisons of utility are possible and
acceptable – which they are not!
I rank all the competing procedures for electing one out of m candidates (m≥ 2)
according to two criteria: First,I prefer all Condorcet-consistent procedures over all
procedures that are not Condorcet-consistent. Second, among Condorcet-consistent
procedures I prefer those which are not vulnerable to non-monotonicity or to elect-
ing a Pareto-dominated candidate when a Condorcet winner does not exist; and
among the procedures which are not Condorcet-consistent I prefer those which are
not susceptible to one or more of the following four pathologies which I consider
as especially serious: non-monotonicity, not electing a candidate who constitutes
the top preference of an absolute majority of the voters (aka absolute Condorcet
winner), electing a candidate who is a Condorcet loser or is Pareto-dominated.
According to these criteria I approved only Kemeny’s and Copeland’s procedures
because they are both Condorcet-consistent and are not susceptible to any of the
above mentioned four pathologies.
My rank-order of the 18 competing procedures is as follows:
Kemeny > Copeland > Black > Nanson > Untrapped Set > Fishburn > Un-
covered Set > Top Cycle > Simpson > Borda > Coombs > Alternative Vote >
2-round Majority > Plurality > Majority Judgment > Approval Voting > Leximin
> Range Voting.
W. V. Gehrlein
In all honesty, I do not remember exactly which of the many possible rules that
were listed that I voted for during this impromptu exercise. However, my general
convictions were expressed on the ballot that I submitted. The first statement on
my ballot was: ”In a perfect world I would recommend any Condorcet consistent
voting rule”. Standard arguments against the implementation of majority rule based
voting are too heavily focused on one atypical example of something that could
conceivably happen to ignore an ’almost-majority’ minority voting bloc with strong
preferences. The obvious question is: What is the likelihood that such a scenario
would ever actually exist? We all know that such hypothetical voting situations can
always be developed to make any voting rule appear to behave very poorly on some
criterion. The only practical way out of this dilemma must therefore be based on the
likelihoods that voting rules display such bad behavior. In the context of evaluating
voting rules to elect the mayor of a city in a typical situation, my assumption from
scenarios that I am familiar with would make the possibility negligible that there
would ever be more than four candidates. Since there is a very high probability that
a Condorcet winner will exist in such cases, why should we not elect that candidate?
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The answer to the immediately preceding question is that Condorcet consistent
procedures are not always easy to implement with a larger number of candidates,
which led to my second statement on the ballot. ”In the real world I would recom-
mend (some elimination rules that I do not recall) and Borda Rule”. These rules
would give a reasonable probability of electing the Condorcet winner, while also
being both explainable to and acceptable to the electorate, without any implication
that simplicity should be the only criterion for evaluating voting rules. Arguments
about the relatively large probability with which some of these voting rules can be
manipulated are typically based on the assumption that one group of voters with
similar preferences can manipulate the outcome, while all other voters are com-
pletely naive to the situation. When it is further assumed that these other voters are
aware of such possibilities and that they can react accordingly, the probability that
the winner could actually be changed is significantly reduced. However, it is defi-
nitely reasonable to conclude from this exercise that plurality rule is not considered
to be acceptable and that Approval Voting is the clear winner when voting is done by
Approval Voting. But, it is critical that we must not forget the significant concerns
that have been raised about the type of winners that are selected when Approval
Voting is employed.
J.-F. Laslier
I do not adhere to the Condorcet principle as a normative principle; if 49% of the
population strongly prefer A to B and 51% slightly prefer B to A, I think that A is
collectively preferable. My first best decision rule is thus utilitarianism, or “range
voting”. But I found Approval Voting a very good practical mechanism to approx-
imately achieve the utilitarian outcome. For the practice, I find that Condorcet-
consistent procedures advisable, except in the extreme but important case of a soci-
ety split in two. The best Condorcet procedure to me is the randomized procedure
studied by B. Dutta, G. Laffond, M. LeBreton and myself under the name Essential
set, but this rule was not proposed. In most cases, the Simpson rule (Minmax proce-
dure) is a good way to select in the Essential set, like Kemeny, Coombs, and others.
My preference was:
Range > Approval > various Condorcet methods among which I make little dif-
ference > Two round plurality > Alternative vote > Leximin > Majority Judgment
> Plurality.
My guess was that, for this election, Approval would win, maybe challenged by
Alternative vote (I was right !). Therefore I voted for Approval and Range. Here is
my complete ranking, with my sincere utilitarian view scaled on the 0-100 scale:
Range (100) > Approval (99) > Kramer-Simpson (85) > Coombs (84) > Ke-
meny (83) > Copeland (82) > Nanson (81) > Black (80) > Borda (50) > Fish-
burn (21) > UncoveredSet (20) > 2-roundMajority (18) > AlternativeVote (17) >
UntrappedSet (16) > TopCycle (15) > Leximin (10) > Majority Judgment (1) >
Plurality (0)
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M. Machover
I consider that decision about which voting procedure should be used must be gov-
erned by some meta-principle. I also consider that an appropriate meta-principle for
the present hypothetical case is majority rule. I therefore gave my approval only
to Condorcet-consistent procedures, selecting those that have additional desirable
properties: Copeland’s and Kemeny’s procedures.
V. Merlin
While considering the question “what is the best voting rule that the city council
of your town should use to elect a mayor?” my first reaction is that the procedure
should be simple and easily understandable by the whole population of the city. The
second question to answer is to which degree the Condorcet principle should be
implemented. I do not adhere to the Condorcet principle, as a majority of 50% plus
epsilon can impose a candidate which is the worst choice of the other voters, without
considering compromise candidates. But at least, I do consider that a Condorcet
loser should never be elected. Hence, Plurality rule is the worst system in the list.
So, I decided to advise Plurality with 2 rounds, Alternative Voting and Approval
Voting. As long as there is a final duel, any elimination system using the plurality
tallies will never elect the Condorcet loser. Plurality with two rounds and Alterna-
tive Voting are such systems. They are easy to explain, and have been implemented
in different countries (France, Australia), with no major complaints. Moreover, Al-
ternative Voting is hardly manipulable. I also consider that k+ 1 rounds before the
final duel are better than k! Though I also voted for Approval Voting, it may be
possible for it to select a Condorcet loser, if everybody just reports his first choice.
But I think that the risk is quite limited, provided that a sufficiently large part of the
population votes sincerely. Experiences show that voters tend also to approve more
than one candidate. What would make me rank Approval Voting slightly below the
two previous rules, is the fact that it has not been widely used in political elections.
I felt that we still need more real life experiences to check that everything goes right
with approval voting, but I am ready to give it its chance.
The simplicity argument goes against many Condorcet-consistent rules. Though
Kemeny is an extremely elegant solution to the voting problem, it is rather sophis-
ticated. For those who think that the Condorcet criterion should be implemented,
I would recommend the Copeland method, which could be easily explained to the
voters, as a tournament among the candidates.
At last, I fear that rules like the Borda count or Range voting could lead to unde-
sired outcomes, when a fraction of the voters tries to manipulate it.
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N. Miller
I cast approval votes for Approval Voting and Copeland. My votes did not reflect
any general normative principle but rather my sense as to what would be both prac-
tical and reasonable for the type of election that Dan Felsenthal stipulated, namely
the election of a mayor when a number of candidates are the ballot. A year ago I
might have approved of AV/IRV also, but I now think that its problems are quite
serious (even in practice, not just in theory). And, as a practical matter, my highest
preference would be for Approval Voting, because it is simple to explain to voters,
simple to cast votes, and simple to count. Moreover, most voters (in the US at least)
would want to see some kind of vote totals in the newspaper the next day, which
Copeland does not provide.
While Plurality lost our vote by a landslide, it works perfectly well in most US
partisan general elections, since Duverger’s Law works so powerfully that there are,
literally or effectively, only two candidates in most such elections (the recent Senate
contests in Florida and Alaska being notable exceptions). However, Approval Voting
might be a definite improvement over Plurality in party primary elections and non-
partisan general elections (which is how many mayors are elected), where often
three or more candidates are on the ballot.
Finally, voting procedures need to be evaluated not only in terms of their “static”
social choice properties (e.g.,Condorcet consistency, monotonicity, etc.) but also
in terms of their “dynamic” effects, e.g., incentives for candidate entry, candidate
ideological positioning, etc., which affect the types of preferences profiles that are
most likely to arise.
H. Nurmi
We were asked to propose voting systems that we could recommend or approve of
to be adopted in the mayoral elections of our municipality. Recommend and approve
of are two different — albeit related — things, but since we were asked to submit
approval ballots, I felt encouraged to suggest more than one system (which I would
NOT do if I were asked to recommend “a system”). I proposed Borda, Nanson and
probably also Kemeny (someone may have preempted me on the latter, though).
Anyway, my ranking is Nanson > Kemeny > Borda > approval voting and these
(as far as I now recall) were on my ballot. Nanson and Kemeny are both pretty
resistant to misrepresentation of preferences and take into account a great deal of
the preference information given by the voters. (One could also point out that they
are Condorcet, but I’m not much moved by that property any longer: some systems
are vulnerable to adding or removing or cloning alternatives (e.g. Borda) (as shown
by Fishburn), others to adding or removing voters with completely tied preferences
(Condorcet)(as shown by Saari). Overall, being based on strict majority principle
is not a decisive feature in my book. Although it can be argued that it is preferable
to be ruled by a majority than by a minority, I think one should also sail clear of
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the dictatorship of majority. They (Nanson and Kemeny) both do well in terms of
several choice theoretic criteria. Borda’s advantage is in intuitively plausible metric
rationalizability: it looks for the closest (in terms of inversion metric) consensus
profile (in terms of the first ranked alternative) and since we are looking for a single
winner, this makes sense. Borda count also does well in minority protection (as
shown by Nitzan). Approval voting was also on my ballot, not so much because
of its choice-theoretic properties, but because of intuitive appeal of its results: it
sounds nice to have a mayor who is deemed acceptable by more voters than any
other. I must say, though, that the interpretation of “approvability” is not obvious
(and this pertains to the interpretation of our balloting result as well). Does the fact
that I approve of a candidate mean that I can tolerate him as the mayor without
resorting to active resistance or does it mean that I positively support him/her? I
think this is what makes the approval voting results hard to interpret, but I guess
a mayor that is even tolerated by more voters than any other candidate has at least
tolerable prospects.
F. Plassmann
I view voting as a useful mechanism for making collective decisions when unani-
mous agreement is not possible. Elections should generally be preceded by discus-
sions about the candidates and the importance that the voters attach to the election.
If a minority of voters feels strongly about some candidates while the other voters
are almost indifferent between these candidates, then it should be possible for the
minority to convince sufficiently many of the others to change their minds prior
to the vote-casting process. (I believe that in cases of near-indifference, most peo-
ple’s desire to preserve social harmony trumps rent-seeking.) If it is not possible to
change sufficiently many voters’ minds, then I would interpret this as evidence that
the intensity in preferences between the groups is not as disparate as it might appear.
I therefore feel comfortable ignoring voting rules that take account of the intensities
of voters’ preferences.
I value the Condorcet principle, and I see the main issue as what we should do
when there is no Condorcet winner. Apart from the fact that it is not Condorcet
consistent, the Borda rule has many attractive properties. Thus my first choice is
Black’s rule, which seems to be least susceptible, among many popular voting rules,
to a wide range of voting paradoxes and which has a very small frequency of ties
(as preliminary research with Nic Tideman suggests). The discontinuity of Black’s
rule also makes strategizing difficult. However, the need to understand two separate
evaluation criteria might make Black’s rule too complicated for some voters. Voters
will accept the outcome of an election only if they understand how the ballots are
to be counted. Approval voting is very simple and avoids some of the most egre-
gious shortcomings of the plurality rule. Thus I would endorse approval voting in
situations when simplicity is important.
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M. Salles
I voted for Approval Voting and for Borda. I share Jean-Franc¸ois’ view regarding the
difficulty concerning majority rule. However, I do not go as far as him and would not
recommend ”range voting”. In case there are a sufficient number of candidates, the
Borda rule proposes a way to deal somehow with intensity of preferences without
going as far as ”Range Voting”. Also I think that the voting method must be simple
enough to be understood by the quasi-totality of the voters, which might not be the
case of the alternative vote system or Kemeny’s rule.
N. Tideman
A group of experts on voting theory wanted to learn their collective judgments of a
variety of voting rules. They decided (by something like acclimation) to proceed by
using approval voting. I thought this was a reasonable way of learning the general
level of support for different voting rules, as a prelude to future discussion. I would
not have recommended approval voting as a way to make a collective judgment of
which voting rule is best. That, I think, requires both more time and a procedure for
ranking the options, so that direct paired comparisons can be made.
I am quite startled by the high level of support for approval voting as a way of
electing a mayor. What I find particularly distressing about approval voting is that it
requires a voter to decide whether to draw a line between generally acceptable and
unacceptable candidates, or to leave that task to other voters and instead to draw
a line between the very best and the close contenders who are not quite as good.
I think that voters for a mayor should not be required to choose between drawing
those two types of lines.
The relevant criteria for a voting rule for mayor, in my opinion, are:
• First, the capacity of the rule to gain the trust of voters. This depends on
the reasonableness and understandability of the logic of the rule and the ease with
which the counting process can be followed. Investigating this requires psychologi-
cal methods as well as knowledge of the logic of voting procedures.
• Second, the likely statistical success of the rule in identifying the outcome with
the greatest aggregate utility, under the assumption that voters vote sincerely. This
is something that can be investigated by statistical methods.
• Third, the resistance of the rule to strategic voting. This too can be investigated
by statistical methods.
It is my guess that the best rule, by some intuitive averaging of these criteria, is
the Simpson rule. But the empirical work that would justify this guess remains to be
done.
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W. Zwicker
When I suggested we vote on voting rules and use Approval Voting, I thought the
proposal could not pass – we’d surely split over the use of Approval Voting. At the
time, however, our “rump session” discussion was stuck and it seemed that a con-
versational grenade might do more good than harm. I was very surprised that no one
objected; some, as one might expect, were enthusiastic. Then I realized the exercise
might be constructive if we could collectively endorse the principle that plurality
rule was terrible... despite the stated goals of our workshop, I’d never thought it
likely that we’d reach even a loose consensus on a single alternative. My own ballot
approved a large number of rules, for two reasons: I doubt that the current state-of-
the-art allows us confidently to select a small number of best rules, and my genuine
indecisiveness was consistent with the best strategy for making plurality look bad.
In terms of my specific approvals, it seems like false comfort to rely on any single
absolute principle as a guide, when every choice of a voting rule entails trade-offs
along many dimensions, about which our understanding is limited. For example, I
feel the draw of Condorcet’s principle but reject it as an absolute, in part because
some recent results suggest trade-offs between that principle and any reasonable de-
gree of decisiveness. I’ve come to view decisiveness as an under-valued trait – very
important, though not decisively so of course. I did approve some Condorcet ex-
tensions, but not top-cycle, because of its striking indecisiveness. Mathematically,
Kemeny is beautiful whereas Black is plug-ugly, but I swallowed hard, approved
Black, and disapproved Kemeny (because Kemeny winner are rankings, not indi-
vidual candidates, and I can imagine what would happen the first time some real
world election yielded a tie among several rankings).
Appendix 2: 18 voting rules
In what follows, the “majority tournament” is the binary relation among candidates:
“More than half of the voters prefer a to b”. In that case we say that a beats b
(according to pair-wise majority rule).
Approval voting [App]
Each voter approves as many candidates as she wishes. The candidate with the most
approval is elected. See Brams and Fishburn (1983), Laslier and Sanver (2010).
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Alternative vote [Alt]
Each voter submits a ranking (possibly incomplete) of the candidates. One first
counts the number of times each candidate appears as top-ranked (his plurality
score). The candidate with the lowest plurality score is eliminated. In a second
count, the votes for this candidate are transferred to the second-ranked candidate
(if any) on these ballots. The process is then repeated again and again until one can-
didate is ranked first by an absolute majority of the votes (original or transferred) is
elected. See Farrell (2001), Farrell and McAllister (2006). Other names for this pro-
cedure or its variants: “Hare” system, “Single Transferable Vote”, “Instant runoff”.
Copeland [Cop]
Each voter submits a ranking of the candidates. For each candidate one computes
his pairwise comparison score, that is the number of challengers this candidate beats
under pair-wise majority rule. The candidates with the largest score are chosen. This
Condorcet-consistent rule does not specify how ties (which are common when there
is no Condorcet winner) are broken. See Laslier (1997). Other name: Tournament
score.
Kemeny [Kem]
Each voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The rule defines a summary ranking
as follows. For any ranking R of candidates one computes the sum, over all pairs
(a,b) of candidates of the number of voters who agree with how R ranks a and
b. Then R∗ is chosen to maximize this total number of agreements. The elected
candidate is the top-ranked candidate according to R∗. This procedure is Condorcet-
consistent. See Young and Levenglick (1978), Young (1988). Other name: Median
ranking.
Two-round majority [2R]
Each voter votes for one candidate. If a candidate obtains an absolute majority, he is
elected. If not, a runoff election takes place among the two candidates who obtained
the most votes. This rule is the most common rule throughout the world for direct
elections, but it has seldom retained the attention of social choice theorists. See
Lijphart (1994), Blais, Massicotte, and Dobrzynska (1997), Taagera (2007), Blais,
Laslier, Sauger, and Van der Straeten (2010). Other name: Plurality with a run-off.
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Coombs [Coo]
Similar to the Alternative Vote but, at each round, if no candidate is ranked first
by an absolute majority of the ballots, the eliminated candidate is the one who is
most often ranked last. This procedure is Condorcet-consistent in the single peaked
domain. Coombs (1964)7.
Majority Judgement [Bal]
Each voter grades each candidate according to some pre-specified finite grading
scale expressed in verbal terms. For each candidate one computes his median
grade. Among the candidates with the highest median grade, a linear approxima-
tion scheme (described in Balinski and Laraki, 2007) is used in order to choose
the elected candidate. See Basset and Persky (1999), Gerlein and Lepelley (2003),
Felsenthal and Machover (2008), Laslier (2011). Other names for this procedure or
its variants: “Robust voting”, “Best median”.
Simpson [Sim]
Each voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The pair-wise vote matrix is com-
puted. Then the chosen candidate is the one against which the smallest majority
(in favor of another candidate) can be gathered. See Simpson (1969). Other names:
“Minimax procedure”, “Simpson-Kramer rule”.
Borda [Bor]
Each voter submits a ranking of the candidates. For K candidates, each one receives
K−1 points each time he is ranked first, K−2 points each time he is ranked second,
etc. The elected candidate is the one who receives the largest number of points.
Black [Bla]
Choose the Condorcet winner if it exists and the Borda winner if not. Suggested by
Black (1958).
7 Thanks to Dan Felsenthal for pointing to me details of this definition.
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Nanson [Nan]
Each voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The Borda score is computed. Can-
didates with Borda score equal to or below the average are eliminated. Then a new
Borda count is computed, on the reduced profile and the process is iterated. This
procedure is Condorcet-consistent. See Nanson (1883).
Range Voting [RV]
Each voter gives to each candidate as many points as she wishes between zero and,
say, 10 points. The elected candidate is the one who receives the largest number of
points. Range Voting is not often considered in the voting rule literature since, from
the theoretical point of view, it is essentially plain utilitarianism. See Arrow, Sen
and Suzumura (2002), Dhillon and Mertens (1999), Baujard and Igersheim (2010)
or the rangevoting.orgweb site. Other names for this procedure or its variants:
“Utilitarianism”, “Point voting” and in French: “vote par note”, which just means
”voting by grading.”
Top Cycle [TC]
Each voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The majority tournament is com-
puted. The Top-Cycle is the smallest set of candidates such that all candidates in
this set beat all candidates outside this set. This Condorcet-consistent rule does not
specify how ties (which occur when there is no Condorcet winner) are broken. See
Schwartz (1972), Laslier (1997).
Uncovered set [UC]
Each voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The majority tournament is com-
puted. A candidate a belongs to the Uncovered set if and only if, for any other can-
didate b, either a beats b or a beats some c who beats b. This Condorcet-consistent
rule does not specify how ties (which occur when there is no Condorcet winner) are
broken. See Miller (1980), McKelvey (1986), Laslier (1997). Other name (in the
graph-theory literature): “Kings procedure”.
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Leximin [Lex]
Each voter grades each candidate according to some pre-specified grading scale.
Each candidate k is evaluated according to the worst grade he received, say g(k) =
minv g(k,v). The elected candidate is the one with the best evaluation g∗=maxk g(k).
If several candidates have the same evaluation g∗, the elected candidate is the one
who receives g∗ the least often. This rule is an important benchmark for normative
economics. See Arrow, Sen and Suzumura (2002).
Fishburn
This choice correspondence is a variant of the Uncovered set which is useful when
the majority relation contains ties (exactly as many voters prefer a to b than b to a).
See Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999).
Untrapped set
This choice correspondence defined by Duggan (2007) is a variant of the Top-Cycle
which is useful when the majority relation contains ties (exactly as many voters
prefer a to b than b to a).
Plurality
Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the most votes is elected.
This is the most common voting rule in the Anglo-saxon world and the literature is
very large. Other name: First Past the Post.
Appendix 3: Statistical significance of the 3D representation
The method for spatial representation of data sets is derived from multivariate factor
analysis. Given is a symmetric matrix of positive numbers, intended to measure the
distances between the items, say dist(c,c′). If each item c is represented by a point
φ(c) in the Euclidean space of dimension d one can compute the sum of the squares
of the distances between the items:
∑
c,c′
dist2(c,c′),
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called the total variance, and compare this sum to the sum of squares of the distances
between the corresponding points:
∑
c,c′
(φ(c)−φ(c′))2,
called the explained variance. The best representation with d dimensions can be
computed numerically using linear algebra. The quality of the representation is mea-
sured by the ratio between explained and total variance. This technique was used for
Approval Voting data by Laslier and Van der Straeten (2004) and by Laslier (2006).
Of course the quality of the representation can only increase with the number of
dimensions. In the text I show a 3D representation that explains about 90% of the
the variance. In order to check whether this figure should be considered as large, I
replicated the same computation on randomly generated data. Recall that, with the
real data the explained percentages are, respectively 39, 66 and 90 for 1, 2 and 3
dimensions.
In a first test, suppose that each voter approves of each candidate indepen-
dently with a probability p that corresponds to the average approval rate (here:
p = 78/(15 ∗ 22) ' .236). Running 10.000 simulations I find that the observed
figures 39%,66%,90%) are respectively attained with probability .016, .005 and
.0005. It is thus clear that our data set has much more structure than a totally ran-
dom one, in which all candidates are alike, up to random fluctuations.
In a second test, suppose that we set the expected number of approval votes
received by each candidate c to its actual value. So suppose that each voter inde-
pendently approves of each candidate c with a probability p(c) equal to the actual
approving percentage of this candidate. For instance for the candidate Approval Vot-
ing, p(App) = 15/22 ' .6818. We thus keep trace that some candidates are good
and some are not, but we lose the correlation among candidates. In that case, I find
that that the observed figures (39%,66%,90%) are respectively attained with proba-
bility .07, .07 and .03. Again one can conclude from this statistical test that it is not
by chance that the real data set provides such large figures.
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